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Abstract 
An insufficient level of structural reforms remains a perennial phenomenon in the EU. Despite the 
gradual expansion of macroeconomic governance, legal instruments fostering the implementation 
of structural reforms have been underexploited. This article examines the leeway provided by EU 
Treaties and legislation to use existing and new instruments to incentivize structural reforms more 
forcefully. First, in light of the recent change in the EU Commission’s enforcement practice, we 
highlight how the sanctions-based regime under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) can be 
extended to incorporate structural reforms. There is significant room for manoeuvre to account 
for the implementation of structural reforms both in the preventive and the corrective arm of the 
SGP. Second, contractual agreements on structural reforms offer an alternative to the sanction 
based system. Unlike existing instruments, contractual agreements allow for more egalitarian and 
reward-based incentives and thus deviate from the classic 'surveillance model' of economic 
governance in the EU. We can conceptualize such agreements in two ways: First, as agreements 
concluded between the EU and individual Member States, underpinned by financial support as 
an incentive. Second, as mutual agreements concluded between Member States, which agree on 
the implementation of structural reforms as a kind of barter trading ensuring reciprocity. We 
highlight the legal boundaries on scope and design of such agreements and how they relate to 
the institutional governance setting in the EU. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The regime governing the EU Member States’ fiscal and 
macroeconomic policies has undergone significant changes over the 
last few years. As a reaction to the sovereign debt crises, the legal 
framework has been modified on various occasions and the scope of 
economic policy surveillance has been expanded significantly. At the 
same time, an insufficient level of structural reforms persists1 and has 
been lamented widely.2 Some of these reforms are critical for the 
                                                 
1 S Deroose and J Griesse, 'Implementing economic reforms - are EU Member 
States responding to European Semester recommendations?' (October 2014) 
ECOFIN Economic Brief, 17 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic 
_briefs/2014/pdf/eb37_en.pdf> accessed 7 January 2016. 
2 European Commission, '2015 European Semester: Country-specific 
recommendations' (Communication) COM (2015) 250 final; OECD, Economic 
Policy Reforms 2012: Going for Growth (OECD Publishing 2012), Chapter 1; D 
growth and sustainability of the euro zone as a whole, as they imply 
positive externalities across countries.3 
 
In the past, economic governance in the EU has addressed the lack of 
structural reforms mainly through five mechanisms. First, before the 
inception of the euro area, Member States coordinated their economic 
policies through the (implicit) pressure exerted through compliance with 
the convergence criteria. Second, during the first decade of the euro, 
structural reforms were incorporated into the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines, but progress was limited mainly due to the lack of binding 
coordination mechanisms. Third, more recently significant reforms were 
implemented in countries under conditionality-based financial 
assistance programmes aiming at both fiscal and macroeconomic 
stability.4 However, reforms have been implemented only under severe 
pressure, while ownership for the reforms stayed weak. In addition, 
conditionality-based programmes only applied to a few countries in the 
first place – they do not offer an instrument to allow for a broader 
implementation of structural reforms going beyond countries under the 
programmes.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
Anderson and others, 'Fiscal Consolidation in the Euro Area: How Much Pain 
Can Structural Reforms Ease?' (October 2013) IMF Working Paper 
<http://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft 
/wp/2013/wp13211.pdf> accessed 7 January 2016; European Central Bank, 
'Progress with structural reforms across the euro area and their possible impacts' 
(2015) ECB Economic Bulletin, 2 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/art01_eb201502.en.pdf> accessed 7 
January 2016. 
3 Simulations show that the simultaneous implementation of structural reforms 
throughout the euro zone would have a bigger effect on output than they would if 
implemented by countries in isolation, highlighting the benefits of coordinated 
policy action; see European Commission, Quarterly Report on the Euro Area 
13(4) (2014) <http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications 
/qr_euro_area/2014/pdf/qrea4_en.pdf> accessed 7 January 2016. 
4 F Fabbrini, 'The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the Political 
Process in Comparative Perspective' (2014) 32 Berkeley Journal International 
Law 64, 73-74. 
Fourth, since the introduction of the EU 2020 strategy and the 
European Semester, the focus of the initially purely fiscal governance 
has been broadened towards other fields of economic and social policy. 
However, these instruments (still largely) remain in the sphere of 'soft 
coordination', which lacks concrete policy tools or a binding effect.5  
 
Fifth, reforms of the binding and sanction-based EU legal framework 
have allowed for stronger surveillance within the EU, with extended 
mechanisms on fiscal and macroeconomic governance. In this vein, the 
Commission announced it would interpret the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) as offering 
leeway for the account of structural reforms under these procedures to 
the extent possible.6 This avenue indeed offers opportunities to perform 
the existing sanction-based surveillance system with a stronger focus 
on the implementation of structural reforms.  
 
A sixth (and as yet unexploited) enforcement mechanism relies on the 
idea of so-called Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument (CCI) 
proposed by the Commission encompassing contractual arrangements 
to be agreed between Member State and the Commission underpinned 
                                                 
5 KA Armstrong, 'The Lisbon Agenda and Europe 2020: From the Governance of 
Coordination to the Coordination of Governance' in P Copeland and D 
Papadimitriou (eds), The EU's Lisbon Strategy (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 208-
228; on the poor compliance record regarding the implementation of country-
specific recommendations, see Deroose and Griesse (n 1) 1; however, the 
Commission can indirectly incentivize the implementation of the country-specific 
recommendations based on Articles 121(2) and 148(4) TFEU in line with Article 
23 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 laying down common provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion 
Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion 
Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 320–469. Based on this 
provision, the Commission can request the Member State to prioritize projects 
identified in the country-specific recommendations in order to obtain financial 
support from the European Structural and Investment Funds. 
6 European Commission, 'Communication, Making the Best Use of the Flexibility 
Within the Existing Rules of the SGP' COM (2015) 12 final, 9. 
by financial support.7 A similar idea is 'mutually agreed contractual 
arrangements' ('Vertragspartnerschaften'), floated by German 
Chancellor Merkel in 2012.8 The underlying idea is to obtain 'hard' 
reform commitments from Member States without delegating more 
power to new or old European institutions. Alternatively, one may 
extend this idea towards bilateral agreements on national reform 
commitments between Euro members without involving the EU, as 
envisaged by a joint report from France and Germany on economic 
reforms focusing on competitiveness and investment issues.9 This joint 
report by the respective minsters of economic affairs remained purely 
political in nature without taking legal effect, but both its level of detail 
and reciprocal nature could give an indication of the possible design of 
bilateral CCIs on national reform commitments.10 Under bilateral 
agreements between Member States, reciprocity in the deal would 
ensure the positive cross-border spillovers from the domestic reforms 
and increase the Member States’ otherwise lacking willingness to 
reform. 
                                                 
7 See the two Communications: European Commission, Towards a deep an 
genuine EMU: the introduction of a Convergence and Competitiveness 
Instrument' (Communication) COM (2013) 165 final; and European Commission, 
'Towards a deep and genuine EMU: Ex ante coordination of plans for major 
economic policy reforms' (Communication) COM (2013) 166 final. The 
contractual arrangements were mentioned already in the Commission’s blueprint 
for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union: launching a European 
debate, European Commission, 'A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic 
and monetary union Launching a European Debate' (Communication) COM 
(2012) 777 final/2. 
8 N Busse and M Schäfers, 'Fahrplan für die nächsten Monate' FAZ (12 
December 2012) <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/europaeische-union/eu-gipfel-
fahrplan-fuer-die-naechsten-monate-11992749.html> accessed 7 February 2016. 
9 J Duffy, 'French-German Report to Focus on Reform and Investment' (Euro 
Insight, 27 November 2014) <https://euroinsight.mni-news.com/posts/french-
german-report-to-focus-on-reform-and-investment> accessed 7 February 2016.  
10 The report was prepared by two academics and outlined a broad reform 
agenda covering regulatory initiatives, investment strategies and reform priorities, 
see H Enderlein and J Pisani-Ferry, 'Reforms, Investments and Growth, An 
agenda for France, Germany and Europe' <https://www.hertie-
school.org/fileadmin/images/ 
Downloads/core_faculty/Henrik_Enderlein/Enderlein_Pisani_Report_EN.pdf> 
accessed 20 March 2016. 
 
Against this background, this analysis explores the existing (but not yet 
exploited) scope for manoeuvre provided under the current legal 
framework in promoting structural reforms (fifth and sixth issue 
mentioned above). On this basis, this contribution seeks to offer legal 
as well as policy insight. From a legal perspective, the implementation 
issues surrounding sanction-based and reward-based mechanisms 
have not featured prominently in the discourse. There are various 
strands of legal literature on economic governance. In recent years, 
they focussed on the competence and legality issues surrounding the 
anti-crisis instruments employed by EU institutions11, the complex 
evolution of both soft and hard formats of governance12 and the overall 
gradual expansion of coordination methods.13 This article seeks to add 
insight into the legal feasibility of practically relevant coordination 
                                                 
11 More recently, the discussion particularly focused on the competence and 
legality review of the OMT program (Case C-62/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, 
Gauweiler) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (Case C-370/12, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, Pringle). On the compatibility of OMT programmes with EU 
law, see A Steinbach, 'The compatibility of the ECB's sovereign bond purchases 
with EU law and German constitutional law' (2013) 39 Yale Journal of 
International Law Online 15; Borgers, 'Outright Monetary Transactions and the 
stability mandate of the ECB: Gauweiler' (2016) 53 CMLR 1-58; on the ESM see 
S Adam and FJ Mena Parras, 'The European Stability Mechanism through the 
Legal Meanderings of the Union’s Constitutionalism: Comment on Pringle' (2013) 
38 EL REV. 848, 860. 
12 On the complementarity of hard law and soft law, see M Dawson, 'Three 
Waves of New Governance in the European Union' (2011) 36 EL Rev. 208; KA 
Armstrong, 'The Character of EU Law and Governance: From 'Community 
Method' to New Modes of Governance' (2011) 63 Current Legal Problems 179-
214. 
13 A Steinbach, Economic Policy Coordination in the Euro Area (Routledge 2014) 
72-171; KA Armstrong, 'The New Governance of EU Fiscal Discipline' (2013) 38 
EL Rev. 601; A Hinarejos, The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective 
(OUP 2015) 15; MW Bauer and S Becker, 'The Unexpected Winner of the Crisis: 
The European Commission’s Strengthened Role in Economic Governance' 
(2014) 36 Journal of European Integration 213-222; G Majone, Rethinking the 
Union of Europe Post-Crisis (CUP 2014) 199, 308; D Chalmers, 'The European 
Redistributive State and a European Law of Struggle' (2012) 18 European Law 
Journal 676-682; A Scott, 'Does Economic Union Require a Fiscal Union?' in LW 
Shuibhne and NN Gormley (eds), From Single Market to Economic Union (OUP 
2012) 40-50. 
mechanisms (and thus also to offer policy relevance) by exploring the 
existing surveillance regime and the scope of manoeuver remaining 
under the current sanction-based rules incorporated in the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Also, only scant attention has been given to the (policy-
relevant) attempts to shift coordination efforts into a more egalitarian 
direction by allowing contractual relationships within the multilevel EU 
governance system to pave the way for a reward-based approach 
towards economic policy coordination – this gap begs an inquiry on the 
different formats of contractual agreements.  
 
Thus, this article seeks to offer insight into the coordination instruments 
both de lege lata (Stability and Growth Pact) and de lege ferenda 
(contractual agreements). By tying the legal analysis to the policy issue 
of an insufficient level of structural reforms, we explore incentive-based 
mechanisms that promote the implementation of structural reforms in 
EU Member States. Incentive-based mechanisms refer to both the 
established sanction-based logic of the existing surveillance 
mechanisms as well as to reward-based instruments offering benefits to 
Member States for implementing structural reforms. While the sanction-
based logic is enshrined in SGP and MIP, contractual agreements 
rather follow a reward-based approach. 
 
The article is structured as follows: Section II identifies the flexibility 
within the existing fiscal surveillance system, with a particular view 
towards promoting structural reforms. In particular, relevant norms of 
the SGP and MIP are interpreted and contrasted with the Commission’s 
more recent enforcement practice. Section III examines reward-based 
coordination discussing nature and scope of contractual agreements 
between the EU and Member States or between Member States 
providing a 'quid pro quo' of structural reforms and financial support. 
Section IV concludes. 
 
II. SANCTION-BASED PROMOTION OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS UNDER THE 
SGP 
 
The SGP remains the key instrument of fiscal policy coordination, 
featuring binding rules and sanction mechanisms.14 In the past, 
application of the SGP focused on fiscal policy and compliance with 
numerical budget rules. This narrow focus has been subject to criticism 
pointing, inter alia, at other elements promoting growth and positive 
long-term budgetary effects, such as structural reforms. The 
Commission has identified structural reforms as key elements of the 
EU’s economic policy strategy for growth.15 In line with the overall trend 
towards broadening the surveillance focus from a purely fiscal to a 
more macroeconomic perspective, incentive-based tools can be 
extended towards promoting structural reforms. 
 
Under the preventive arm of the SGP, the so-called structural reform 
clause provides the legal basis for introducing the implementation of 
structural reforms under the fiscal surveillance regime. According to 
Article 5 of Regulation No. 1466/97, the Commission and Council shall 
'take into account the implementation of major structural reforms' when 
defining the adjustment path to the medium-term budgetary objective. 
Major structural reforms may, under specific circumstances, justify a 
temporary deviation from the MTO of the concerned Member State or 
from the adjustment path towards it. Thus, under the preventive arm, 
there is an explicit reference allowing the linking of the fiscal regime 
under the SGP to a broader macroeconomic dimension of structural 
reforms.16  
 
1.Connecting Coordination Mechanisms 
In this vein, the explicit reference to structural reforms in Article 5 
(which had been incorporated into the Regulation already in 2005) may 
serve as the basis to connect various economic policy coordination 
tools to each other. Structural reforms are typically dealt with in the 
                                                 
14 For an interpretation of the SGP as a tool to avoid free-riding, see Steinbach, 
Economic Policy (n 13) 28; P De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union (10th 
edn, OUP 2014) 218-224. 
15 European Commission, 'Annual Growth Survey 2015' (Communication) COM 
(2014) 902. 
16 Regarding the evolutionary process towards linking the purely fiscal focus of 
EU surveillance to a more comprehensive macroeconomic regime, see 
Steinbach, Economic Policy (n 13) 103-130. 
country-specific recommendations of the European Semester. These 
recommendations are issued in May of each year and provide country-
specific policy advice to Member States in areas deemed as priorities 
for the next 12-18 months.17 
 
The implementation of structural reforms identified in the country-
specific reforms within the European Semester into the SGP through 
Article 5 of Regulation No. 1466/97 sets up a comprehensive 
coordination mechanism that expands the fiscal policy focus of the 
SGP. It creates a link between the implementation of Europe 2020’s 
aims and the fiscal policy requirements of the SGP, interweaving 
economic and social policy recommendations with fiscal policy 
commitments. The recommendations typically address a variety of 
subjects, including public finances, tax policy issues, and labour market 
questions. Through the European Semester, the EU is no longer 
restricted to issuing economic and fiscal policy aims. It now also 
advises national governments on specific measures to reach these 
aims. We thus see a clear effort to consolidate, synchronize and 
expand existing forms of coordination.18 The avowed aim is to stop 
fiscal and economic policy isolation and align policies with each other. 
  
Importantly, through the structural reform clause, the recommendations 
under the European Semester are upgraded in terms of their binding 
nature. Usually, country-specific recommendations are non-binding; the 
only way the Commission typically can force states to adhere to its 
recommendations is through peer pressure, i.e., 'naming and 
shaming'.19 However, once the country-specific recommendations are 
channelled through the structural reform clause, they factually gain 
binding nature as they are tied to the enforcement of fiscal rules. 
 
2. Structural Reforms Under the SGP 
A. Preventive Arm 
In its Communication, the Commission has set out a number of 
principles to be followed for the structural reforms clause to be 
                                                 
17 For a detailed analysis of the European Semester, see Armstrong, 'The New 
Governance' (n 13) 601. 
18 Steinbach, Economic Policy (n 13) 173-176. 
19 Steinbach, Economic Policy (n 13) 126. 
activated.20 First, reforms must be major in terms of their effect on 
growth and the sustainability of public finances. Requiring a significant 
impact enables the Commission to request sizeable and effective 
reforms and an appropriate choice of policy mix. Second, reforms must 
have a long-term positive budgetary effect where this effect can 
correspond to direct budgetary savings from reforms (e.g., pension 
reform) or through increased revenues (e.g., as a result of an increased 
labour force). Third, and most controversial, is that the wording of 
Article 5 of Regulation No. 1466/97 requires the 'implementation' of 
structural reforms. As pointed out by the Council Legal Service, the 
Commission’s approach is rather ambiguous on this point.21 While the 
Commission requires 'full implementation' of the reform, it 
acknowledges that adopted reforms may take time and thus views the 
implementation of reforms as fulfilled when 'the Member State presents 
a medium-term structural reform plan'. By contrast, the Council refers to 
the Code of Conduct, according to which the 'implementation' pursuant 
to Article 5 requires that 'only adopted reforms should be considered'.22  
 
(1) Interpreting and Applying the Term 'Implementation' of Structural 
Reforms 
The question at stake is what status of implementation is required, that 
is, whether these reforms have to be formally adopted under domestic 
laws, giving them binding force,23 or whether a detailed structural 
reform plan is sufficient.24 From a legal perspective, given that 
interpretation of the term 'implementation' is at stake, recourse should 
be taken to conventional modes of legal interpretation. Reference to the 
literal meaning25 produces ambiguous results as shown in the 
                                                 
20 European Commission, 'Making the Best Use of the Flexibility Within the 
Existing Rules of the SGP' (Communication) COM (2015) 12 final, 11. 
21 Council of the European Union, 'Opinion of the Legal Service', Ref 7739/15 (7 
April 2015), para. 21. 
22 ibid para. 23. 
23 ibid para. 23. 
24 European Commission, 'Making the Best Use of the Flexibility Within the 
Existing Rules of the SGP' (Communication) COM (2015) 12 final, 11.  
25 On this mode of interpretation see only Case 30/59, ECLI:EU:C:1961:2,  
Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v ECSC High Authority, 49; Case 207/81, 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:281, Felicitas v Finanzamt ; see also the Court's literal and 
controversial perceptions between Commission and Council.26 
Implementation clearly is a stepwise approach that ranges from initial 
internal decision-making among policy-makers up to the actual entering 
into force of a specific measure. A restrictive reading would imply the 
completion of the entire implementation process, which, however, 
would render the clause impractical given the lengthy implementation 
process. 
  
Looking from a contextual perspective27, however, guidance on 
interpretation may be sought from practice under the financial support 
programmes of the EU. The pattern of conditionality and disbursement 
of payment offers an understanding that the favourable treatment 
(under EU financial assistance, the disbursement of loans) is typically 
granted on the basis of formalized commitments and their forward-
looking implementation. Under the support programmes for Greece, for 
instance, before each disbursement, a joint mission of Commission, 
ECB and IMF staff frequently monitors compliance with the conditions 
of the conditionality programme. More specifically, disbursements of 
respective tranches are linked to the implementation of milestones 
agreed between Greece and the troika institutions. Disbursements are 
tied to forward-looking commitments, including steps to implement 
these reforms fully through secondary legislation, other administrative 
acts and complementary reforms.28 It becomes clear that the practice of 
                                                                                                                                     
systematic approach to interpreting Article 125 TFEU, see V Borger, 'The ESM 
and the European Court's Predicament in Pringle' (2013) 14 German Law Journal 
113, 117. 
26 European Commission, 'Making the Best Use of the Flexibility Within the 
Existing Rules of the SGP' (Communication) COM (2015) 12 final, 10; Council of 
the European Union, 'Opinion of the Legal Service', Ref 7739/15 (7 April 2015), 
para. 23; European Union, 'Specifications on the implementation of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (Code of Conduct)' (3 September 2012) 5. 
27 The Court takes account of the meaning of a provision in light of scheme and 
context, Case 149/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:130, Defrenne v SABENA, Case 87/75, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:18, Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze. The 
Court also applies interpretation methods cumulatively, see more recently Case 
C-399/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, Melloni v Ministerio  Fiscal. 
28 Report on Greece's compliance with the milestones for the disbursement to the 
Hellenic Republic of the third tranche of EUR 1.0bn of the EFSF instalment 
related to the fourth review under the second programme, 11 August 2014. 
requiring implementation of reforms as prerequisite for a disbursement 
is an institutionalized alternation of 'quid pro quo' on a forward-looking 
basis. Through the splitting of the financial support into disbursements, 
the milestones towards implementation can be coupled to respective 
disbursements. 
  
Applying this functionality to the exchange of structural reforms in return 
for favourable treatment under Article 5 of Regulation No. 1466/97, one 
can infer that, in general, a forward-looking commitment should suffice. 
This implies that implementation in terms of a credible, comprehensive 
and detailed plan should be sufficient. However, given that the split into 
disbursements provides an effective tool to review and control the 
actual implementation (that is, transformation of structural reforms into 
legislative acts), the question is whether a similar implementation 
control can be operationalized with regard to Article 5 of Regulation No- 
1466/97. Indeed, the metric of Article 5 provides such implementation 
control in case of a Member State’s failure to implement the agreed 
reform. In such a case, the temporary deviation from the Medium-Term 
Budgetary Objective (MTO) will no longer be considered as 
warranted.29 On the basis of Article 6(2) and Article 10(2) of Regulation 
No. 1466/97, the Commission can issue a warning to the Member State 
and ultimately propose to the Council a recommendation to request that 
Member States take appropriate policy measures. In case of continued 
failure to implement the structural reform, euro area Member States 
may ultimately be requested to lodge an interest-bearing deposit.30 The 
existing sanction-based instruments allow an interpretation of the term 
'implementation' under Article 5 based on an alternation of ex-ante 
assessment and ex-post control.  
 
This finding is also in line with an interpretation focusing on the purpose 
and spirit of the provision.31 Its aim is to provide temporary fiscal relief 
                                                 
29 European Commission, 'Council Recommendation on the 2015 National 
Reform Programme of Belgium and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 
Stability Programme of Belgium' COM (2015) 252 final, 12. 
30 Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of 
budgetary surveillance in the euro area, OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 1–7. . 
31 On this mode of interpretation see already Case 65/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:7,  
Derycke  34; Case 79/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:70, Baccini v ONEM  1076. 
in return for the implementation of measures that actually have a long-
term positive budgetary effect. This aim can be sufficiently safeguarded 
through the control mechanism described above, which allows a return 
to the initial MTO and imposes sanctions in case of implementation 
failure. In sum, the deviation from the MTO is warranted based on 
credible reform commitments, the implementation of which is 
sufficiently incentivized by the threat of modification of the favourable 
MTO path. 
 
(2) Streamlining Coordination Mechanisms 
In terms of consistency between the various economic policy 
coordination instruments, the choice of structural reforms under Article 
5 should be streamlined with the policy recommendations of other EU 
economic policy instruments. First, the Commission can take recourse 
to the structural reforms identified in the country-specific 
recommendations under the European Semester, which offer a detailed 
set of goals and instruments across economic and social policy areas. 
Second, the Commission should streamline the application of Article 5 
by way of reference to the country-specific recommendations issued 
under its MIP based on Regulation No 1176/2011. The scope of the 
MIP goes beyond fiscal parameters that extend to all possible factors 
related to macroeconomic performance.32 More specifically, according 
to Article 8 of Regulation No 1176/2011, the Council adopts a country-
specific corrective action plan listing the specific actions required to 
resolve the imbalances. 
  
Given the significant degree of parallel proceedings under SGP and 
MIP, the structural reforms clause under the corrective arm provides 
the legal basis to ensure consistency between the two policy tools. In 
fact, by June 2015, seven Member States were involved in parallel 
proceedings under the EDP and the MIP, demonstrating the practical 
                                                 
32 Steinbach, Economic Policy (n 13) 103-122; M Buti and N Carnot, 'The EMU 
Debt Crisis: Early Lessons and Reforms' (2012) 50 JCMS 899-911; D Gros, 
'Macroeconomic Imbalances in the Euro Area: Symptom or cause of the crisis?' 
(2012) CEPS Policy brief, 266 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2060118> accessed 7 
February 2016. 
relevance of applying both economic policy regimes consistently.33 
Also, 16 out of 27 Member States were subject to the MIP and thus had 
received country-specific recommendations under this procedure. The 
structural reform agenda spelled out in detail under the MIP34 should 
thus be the natural reference point for the structural reform clause 
under the SGP. 
 
B. Corrective Arm 
While there is an explicit reference to structural reforms under the 
preventive arm in Article 5 of Regulation No. 1466/97, the relevant 
norms of the corrective arm are silent on the treatment of structural 
reforms. The only legal term potentially allowing the incorporation of 
structural reforms into the assessment under the corrective arm is laid 
down in Article 2 of Regulation No. 1467/97, which states that the 
Commission '[…] shall take into account all relevant factors […] in so 
far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the 
deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned'. The reference 
to 'relevant factors' has been interpreted by the Commission as 
including the implementation of structural reforms set out in the 
European Semester.35  
 
Given the vagueness of this provision, the question is whether this 
interpretation remains within the boundaries of the legal text. A number 
of aspects can be put forward in the affirmative: First, the Commission 
enjoys wide leeway of discretion in the application of EU rules. On 
                                                 
33 Croatia, France, Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
34 For example, Belgium has to 'improve the functioning of the labour market by 
reducing financial disincentives to work, increasing labour market access for 
specific target groups and addressing skills shortages and mismatches' 
(European Commission, 'Council Recommendation on the 2015 National Reform 
Programme of Belgium and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability 
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various occasions, the Court has confirmed that the Commission enjoys 
wide discretion in the assessment of economic circumstances.36 
Second, there is no indication that interpreting structural reforms as 
'relevant factors' would be incompatible with the overall purpose of the 
excessive deficit procedure. The main purpose of the excessive deficit 
procedure is to ensure the prompt correction of excessive deficits, i.e., 
making sure that Member States return to a sustainable fiscal position. 
Structural reforms would have to further this goal. The Commission37 
and other EU institutions38 have repeatedly underscored the relevance 
of structural reforms as an essential element for long-term positive 
budgetary development. Structural reforms are a requisite for growth as 
the basis for fiscal sustainability. The positive correlation between 
structural reforms and positive budgetary effects is also acknowledged 
in Article 5 of Regulation No. 1466/97, which explicitly refers to 
structural reforms that have such a positive budgetary effect. Third, and 
in the same vein, for the sake of consistency between the preventive 
and corrective arm of the SGP, the same reasoning and logic should be 
applied given that both arms share the overriding fiscal policy goals. 
 
Consequently, structural reforms could likely be integrated into the 
excessive deficit procedure under the same conditions as discussed 
above for the preventive arm, that is, they must be major, have a long-
term positive budgetary effect and be implemented within the meaning 
discussed above. The peculiar design allows the Commission to 
account for structural reforms on two stages of the excessive deficit 
procedure. First, when assessing whether an excessive deficit 
procedure needs to be launched, the Commission may examine all 
'relevant factors' concerning the economic, budgetary and debt 
                                                 
36 See only, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, Microsoft v Commission, para. 
87; Case T-168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265, GlaxoSmithKline v. Commission, para. 
57. 
37 European Commission, 'Making the Best Use of the Flexibility Within the 
Existing Rules of the SGP' (Communication) COM (2015) 12 final, 5.  
38 J-C Juncker, 'Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’ (2015) Five 
Presidents' Report <https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/5-
presidents-report_en.pdf> accessed 7 February 2016, 7. 
positions.39 The Commission may consider structural reforms as 
mitigating or aggravating factors that have an effect on its decision to 
open the procedure or not. Second, structural reforms as a relevant 
factor are also considered for determining the deadline for the 
correction of the excessive deficit. Thus, the implementation of major 
structural reforms constitutes a relevant factor that allows for a 
multiannual path for the correction of excessive deficit.40  
 
As under the preventive arm, the review and control of the 
implementation of reforms are ensured through procedural remedies. 
Failure to implement the reform will induce the Commission to consider 
the Member State’s conduct insufficient, leading to the opening of the 
excessive deficit procedure or to the shortening of the deadline for the 
correction of  
the excessive deficit. For Euro area Member States, this means that the 
Commission may recommend to the Council the imposition of a 
fine.41In sum, there is significant leeway to account for the 
implementation of structural reforms both in the preventive and 
corrective arm of the SGP. A comprehensive and detailed structural 
reform plan containing well-specified measures, verifiable information 
and credible timelines may lead to a modification of the medium-term 
budgetary objective. The requirements attached to the degree of 
implementation should not be too high, given that there is sufficient 
potential for sanctions and withdrawal of the favourable treatment. 
Similarly, under the EDP, structural reforms may be a relevant factor 
when decisions are made about opening procedures and setting the 
deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. Incorporation of 
country-specific recommendations under the European Semester, as 
well as the corrective action plan under the MIP, ensures consistency of 
the economic policy tools.  
 
3. Investments and the Structural Reform Clause 
The discussion on implementing structural reforms in Member States is 
often tied to Member States’ policy space to promote investments. 
                                                 
39 European Commission, 'Making the Best Use of the Flexibility Within the 
Existing Rules of the SGP' (Communication) COM (2015) 12 final, 13.  
40 ibid 13. 
41 Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011. 
Politically, the connection is valid given that structural reforms often 
imply fiscal retraction in the short term, triggering a discussion on using 
investments as a measure to counter such short-term effects and lay 
the ground for long-term growth. The EU Commission has addressed 
such concerns by explicitly linking structural reforms with investments.42 
 
The Commission considers that some investments may be deemed to 
be equivalent to major structural reforms within the meaning of the 
structural reforms and may, under certain conditions, justify a 
temporary deviation from the Medium-Term Budgetary Objective of the 
concerned Member State or from the adjustment path towards it. More 
specifically, a Member State will benefit under five conditions: i) if its 
GDP growth is negative or if the GDP remains well below its potential; 
ii) if the deviation from the MTO does not lead to a deficit above the 
reference value of 3%; iii) if the deviation is linked to national 
expenditure on a project co-funded by the EU under one of its various 
funds; iv) if the co-financed expenditure does not substitute for 
nationally financed investments, so that total public investments are not 
reduced; and v) if the Member State compensates for any temporary 
deviations. The (economic) purpose of this extension of the structural 
reform clause is to allow Member States to benefit from this clause 
when their own growth is negative and better reflect the country-specific 
economic situation.43 In this vein, the Commission’s decision is 
economically founded on those studies that find an over-proportionate 
decline of public investments during phases of budgetary 
consolidations.44 
 
However, the Commission’s assimilation of 'public investments' and 
'structural reforms' is questionable. Apart from the obvious literal 
difference between the two terms, the Commission’s own use of the 
concepts 'investments' and 'structural reforms' suggests that these 
terms cannot be used interchangeably as legal terms. In its 2015 
                                                 
42 European Commission, 'Communication, Making the Best Use of the Flexibility 
Within the Existing Rules of the SGP' COM (2015) 12 final, 8. 
43 European Commission, 'Communication, Making the Best Use of the Flexibility 
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Annual Report, for instance, the Commission refers to its well-
established economic policy strategy resting on three pillars comprising 
investments, structural reforms and fiscal responsibility.45 According to 
that economic policy strategy, investments and structural reforms 
constitute individual pillars of the EU economic policy and rest on 
different concepts, though sharing the common goal of promoting 
sustainable growth. More specifically, structural reforms relate to 
reallocating resources efficiently, for example by reducing barriers to 
the reallocation of capital and labour across firms, thus helping to 
ensure that the most productive firms can achieve their growth potential 
and the less efficient ones are restructured or leave the industry.46 By 
contrast, through investments in macroeconomic terms, the public 
sector increases and improves the stock of capital employed in the 
production of the goods and services they provide.47 'Public 
investments' and 'structural reforms' refer to distinct concepts both in 
relation to the use of these terms in the EU legal framework as well as 
with regard to the general meaning of these terms. 
 
Undisputedly, even though public investments and structural reforms 
are conceptually different, there may be cases of coincidence. For 
example, reforms in the education sector may well go hand in hand with 
additional investment spending in this area. In such a case, it may be 
artificial to disentangle structural reforms and public investments, given 
that both are tied to each other and contribute to improving the 
adjustment capacity of an economy. However, the Commission broadly 
assimilates investments and structural reforms and limits eligible 
investments to projects co-funded by the EU funds which have positive 
budgetary effect within Article 5 of Regulation No. 1466/97.48 This 
approach raises concerns on three grounds: First, and considering the 
distinct concept of investment and structural reforms, there is no ground 
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(2014) 902, 5. 
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Growth' (June 2014) ECFIN Economic Brief 34, 1-2. 
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Commission' (2004) Economic Papers No 202, 6. 
48 European Commission, 'Annual Growth Survey 2015' (Communication) COM 
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for a general assumption that all co-financing expenditures by Member 
States amount to structural reforms.49 Rather, a case-by-case analysis 
that examines to which investments the implementation of structural 
reforms is intrinsically tied should be made before investments qualify 
as structural reforms within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Regulation 
No. 1466/97. It may be comprehensible from the Commission’s 
perspective to avoid a burdensome and disputable assessment of 
specific investments as to their quality as structural reform, but a 
general assimilation of investments and structural reforms would not 
account for the conceptual differences between these terms. 
 
Second, and related to the analysis above, there is an issue of 
discrimination. In fact, the Commission discriminates against domestic 
public investments. The Commission gives privilege to any expenditure 
that is co-funded by the EU for the assessment of 'structural reforms' 
pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation No. 1466/97. This is an open 
discrimination against national public investments that might equally be 
linked to structural reforms. Such discrimination ignores the fact that 
economic policy-making remains within the competence of the Member 
States. In principle, Member States retain competence for economic 
policy (Article 4(1), 5(2) TEU). Instead, the EU’s competence lies in 
coordination of the policies, that is in arranging coordination of policies 
that remain national in nature.50 Member States can adopt measures in 
this field, as long as the competences of the Union are not infringed.51 
The conduct of economic policy inherently enshrines the right to identify 
and implement investment and structural reform priorities according to 
a Member State’s preference, and in observance of the country-specific 
state of the economy. The freedom to exercise economic policy as a 
genuine domain of Member States may be restricted if the EU choices 
                                                 
49 Council of the European Union, 'Opinion of the Legal Service', Ref 7739/15 (7 
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of economic policies override national choices. Under the MIP, such 
measures can be a part of the action plan.52 By contrast, the granting of 
privileges – under the fiscal surveillance of the EU – to economic policy 
projects identified by the EU through the activities of its funds (while 
domestic investment projects enjoy a less favourable treatment), 
generates conflicts with Member States freedom in conducting 
economic policies. 
 
Third, from the perspective of effectively implementing the legal fiscal 
framework and given the overall intention of the fiscal surveillance in 
ensuring sustainable fiscal conduct, there is no indication why 
investments co-funded by the EU should rather qualify as a structural 
reform than domestic investment projects. There is neither a general 
legal rule nor an economic rationale according to which projects 
promoted by EU funds would be considered fundamentally different 
from domestic projects, except for the fact that the latter typically imply 
larger cross-border spillover effects. For example, projects co-funded 
under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) do not primarily promote 
projects amounting to structural reforms more than domestic projects 
would do. The CEF finances projects that fill the missing links in 
Europe's energy, transport and digital infrastructure.53 Even though this 
infrastructure may promote the completion of the internal market, there 
is no indication that a national infrastructure project would not serve 
similar goals or contribute otherwise to structural reforms in terms of 
reallocating resources more efficiently. 
 
In sum, an extensive interpretation of the term 'public investment' as a 
structural reform within the meaning of Article 5 of Regulation No. 
1367/97 seems to overstretch the literal and contextual meaning of this 
provision. However, the Commission’s general tendency to promote 
investments within the boundaries of the fiscal rules may be compatible 
with the relevant provision under two conditions. First, a case-by-case 
examination of the investments at stake must give consideration to 
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whether a project is linked to the implementation of structural reforms 
rather than generally equating public investments and structural 
reforms. Second, the general privilege of projects co-funded by EU 
funds over national investment projects appears to be untenable in light 
of the wording and purpose of the rules. Domestic investments should 
generally be treated like EU projects when considering their quality as 
structural reforms for the application of Article 5 of Regulation No.. 
1466/97. Practical inconveniences seem inevitable: While there are no 
legal or economic grounds for discrimination, one must concede that 
considering all public investments as potentially qualifying as structural 
reforms would imply an additional burden of examination on the 
Commission’s side. 
 
III. CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS PROMOTING STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
 
The current surveillance system under the SGP operates in a 
hierarchical manner, that is, the EU Commission leads the procedure 
and has the right to decide authoritatively on the structural reforms that 
are to be implemented. Also, the SGP incentivizes through sanctions 
rather than rewards, as monetary or procedural penalties can be 
imposed in case of non-compliance of a Member State.54 That would 
be fundamentally different if structural reforms were incentivized and 
incorporated by contractual agreements. Such agreements would 
modify the existing logic, as structural reforms would be negotiated 
between the parties and incentives would be set through rewarding the 
implementation of structural reforms. One can conceptualize such 
agreements in two ways: First, through agreements concluded between 
the EU and individual Member States, underpinned by financial support 
as an incentive. Second, as mutual agreements concluded between 
                                                 
54 The sanction-based application of the SGP thus remains within in the 
'surveillance model' of EU coordination, in which the EU is the 'discipline 
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Member States, which agree on the implementation of structural 
reforms in the respective country as a kind of barter trading. 
 
The EU Commission had proposed the Convergence and 
Competitiveness Instrument (CCI) encompassing contractual 
arrangements to be agreed between a Member State and the 
Commission underpinned by financial support.55 In principle, 
participation is voluntary and Member States would need to present an 
action plan similar to that required under the Excessive Imbalance 
Procedure of the MIP.56 The arrangements would be based on the 
country-specific recommendations adopted under the MIP.57 The 
accompanying financial support would only be granted for reforms that 
create positive spillovers across Member States and thus promote the 
functioning of EMU. Financial support should be designed to support 
the financing of difficult reforms. In case of non-compliance with the 
contract, the financial support can be withheld.58  
                                                 
55 See the two Communications: European Commission, 'Towards a deep an 
genuine EMU: the introduction of a Convergence and Competitiveness 
Instrument' (Communication) COM (2013) 165 final; and European Commission, 
'Towards a deep and genuine EMU: Ex ante coordination of plans for major 
economic policy reforms' (Communication) COM (2013) 166 final. The 
contractual arrangements were mentioned already in European Commission, 'A 
blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union Launching a 
European Debate' (Communication) COM (2012) 777 final/2. 
56 European Commission, 'A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and 
monetary union Launching a European Debate' (Communication) COM (2012) 
777 final/2, 21; see also KA Armstrong, 'Differentiated Economic Governance 
and the Reshaping of Dominium-Law' in M Adams and others (eds), The 
Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Hart Publishing 2014) 
65, 77. 
57 European Commission, 'A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and 
monetary union Launching a European Debate' (Communication) COM (2012) 
777 final/2, 21. 
58 European Commission, 'A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and 
monetary union Launching a European Debate' (Communication) COM (2012) 
777 final/2, 22; for an economic consideration, see HP Grüner, 'The Political 
Economy of Structural Reform and Fiscal Consolidation Revisited' (2013) 
Economic Papers 487 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2013/pdf/ec
p487_en.pdf> accessed 7 February 2016, 37. 
 
In view of the existing coordination instruments, the main function of 
contractual agreements is to add a reward-based enforcement 
mechanism of country-specific recommendations on a voluntary basis 
and sidelining the sanctions-based systems as foreseen by the SGP 
and MIP. Its scope of application is naturally greater, as the choice of 
structural reforms is wider and the point in time of their implementation 
is unrestricted, whilst the SGP allows for sanctions if certain fiscal 
parameters are fulfilled. Thus, in practice the added-value of 
contractual agreements could be seen as an instrument fostering 
structural reforms during 'good times' when proceedings under SGP 
and MIP have not been triggered yet. This would also help to maintain 
structural reform efforts when political-economy mechanisms would 
rather lower the efforts to undertake structural reforms. This is further 
supported by the greater ownership that voluntary commitments would 
have compared to the policy recommendations under the European 
Semester, which are typically seen by national policy-makers as 
undesirable interventions of the EU into the national policy space. 
 
1. Contractual Agreements Between the EU and Member States 
Assessing the legal feasibility of contractual agreements raises 
questions regarding the legal nature of contractual agreements and the 
possible legal basis to allow for such agreements sidelined by a funding 
facility. 
 
A. Legal Nature of Contractual Agreements 
The EU treaties are silent on contractual agreements between the EU 
and its Member States. In the absence of an explicit legal basis under 
primary or secondary law, which would provide for a certain 
competence of the EU vis-à-vis the Member States, general 
considerations apply in principle as to the EU’s ability to enter 
contractual relationships. One may consider such agreements as 
constituting international law treaties or, based on specific secondary 
law, as Memoranda of Understanding. 
 
In general, the EU can enter into international agreements according to 
Article 47 TEU and Article 335 TFEU. In addition, Article 216 TFEU 
explicitly recognizes the EU’s possibility to conclude agreements with 
third countries and international organizations. The ability to enter into 
agreements with EU Member States is implicitly acknowledged by 
Article 50 (2) TEU, according to which the EU concludes an agreement 
with a Member State leaving the EU.59 Also, any agreement between 
the EU and a Member State must remain within the substantial 
competences granted to the EU under the treaties.60 The principle of 
conferral in Article 5 TEU would be violated if the EU were to conclude 
an agreement outside of the scope of the legal basis of the EU treaties.  
 
Considering the scope of EU contractual external action determined by 
the EU treaty, it is hard to see how a contractual agreement between 
the EU and its Member States could be set up as an international 
treaty, since the competences of EU and Member States to act on a 
specific field are mutually exclusive. Whoever holds exclusive 
competence is solely competent to conclude agreements and, in the 
field of shared competence, Member States lose their competence to 
the extent that the Union has exercised its competence (Article 2 (2) 
TFEU). In case of contractual agreements foreseeing structural reforms 
in Member States, the EU may be competent based on Article 136 
TFEU or Article 173 TFEU. Agreements promoting the implementation 
of structural reforms generally appear connected to Article 136 TFEU 
as a regular norm providing for economic policy coordination. In the 
past, Article 136 TFEU has been the core legal basis for extending 
budgetary surveillance and economic coordination,61 giving rise to 
concerns about an inadmissible stretching of the boundaries of this 
norm.62 According to the Commission, the contractual agreements 
could be part of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and based 
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61 Hinarejos (n 13) 33. 
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on Article 136 TFEU.63 However, given that this norm is potentially in 
conflict with the genuine Member States’ competence to conduct 
economic policy, coordination competences granted to the EU in this 
area should be interpreted restrictively.64 In relation to the coordination 
competences under Article 136 TFEU, this means that they must 
remain within the scope of the relevant provisions (Article 121 and 126 
TFEU).65 Article 121 (3) and (4) TFEU established a peculiar system of 
macroeconomic monitoring by setting up the authoritative surveillance 
competence of the EU institutions. More specifically, Article 8 (1) of the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure foresees that the EU 
Commission and the Member States develop national reform 
programmes that – unlike the contractual agreements – can be made 
binding as corrective action plans by the Council.66 Considering the 
MIP’s focus on removing macroeconomic imbalances through structural 
reforms, there is a significant conceptual similarity with the measures 
envisaged to form part of contractual agreements, for which the EU 
Commission and the respective Member State consensually negotiate 
the reforms to be incorporated into the agreement. Since contractual 
agreements are less authoritative due to their consensual nature, they 
should be deemed compatible with the more intrusive competence 
granted to the Commission under Article 121 TFEU.67 Member States 
enter contractual agreements on a voluntary basis securing their policy 
space and the choice of structural reforms, their general competence in 
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dealing with economic policy issues is acknowledged, and their position 
is not worsened in case of non-compliance with the contractual 
agreement (apart from losing the support under the financial incentive 
scheme).68 Most importantly, structural reforms agreed upon under 
contractual agreements are intended to ensure conformity with the 
broad guidelines referred to in Article 121 (4) TFEU,69 and they reduce 
the risk of the proper functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union 
being jeopardized, which indicates a parallel between the structural 
reforms under the MIP and the contractual agreements.70 If the EU can 
conclude agreements in line with the principle of conferral and to the 
extent that it enjoys internal competence, Member States cannot longer 
conclude agreements in this area.71  
  
Alternatively, the contractual relationship may be established as a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). While the EU treaties are silent 
on this instrument, it has been used frequently during the crisis, 
rendering financial assistance to states conditional on a number of 
structural reforms.72 More formally, MoUs have even become an 
integral part of Article 13(3) ESM Treaty as the instrument detailing the 
conditionality attached to the financial assistance facility.73 There is 
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some conceptual similarity between the MoUs under the ESM and the 
contractual agreement discussed here – both tie financial support to 
conditionality and largely concern the implementation of structural 
reforms. Incentives towards compliance with contractual agreements 
can then be set by financial assistance that is granted only if there is 
compliance, and withheld in case of non-compliance. Similar to the 
approach chosen under the ESM Treaty, one could adopt secondary 
legislation allowing for the conclusion of contractual agreements. 
However, the MoUs under the ESM Treaty were concluded under an 
international agreement outside of the EU legal framework. By contrast, 
if MoUs foreseeing contractual agreements were set up under EU 
secondary law within EU competence and being adopted by the EU 
Commission, they would become an integral part of the EU legal order. 
As such, compatibility with other EU legislation and in particular with the 
fiscal and macroeconomic regime under the SGP and the MIP would 
have to be ensured – this would be facilitated by the fact that the EU 
Commission would be the leading institutions both in governing the 
ordinary fiscal regime and the conceptual agreements. 
 
B. Funding Contractual Agreements 
Without the possibility to conclude contractual agreements through 
international treaties, contractual agreements ought to be established 
on the basis of secondary legislation.74 One may consider three 
potential legal grounds in the EU treaties, which allow for the 
establishment of funding support sidelining contractual agreements. 
 
First, Articles 136 and 121 TFEU may serve as legal basis for a funding 
scheme sidelining contractual agreements. In Pringle, however, the 
Court found in relation to the ESM that 'neither Article 122(2) TFEU nor 
any other provision of the EU and FEU Treaties confers a specific 
power on the Union to establish a permanent stability mechanism such 
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as the ESM',75 which raises the question whether the fund attached to 
contractual agreements would be construed as a stability mechanism 
like the ESM. However, this is unlikely given the peculiar function of the 
ESM, as 'the ESM is not concerned with the coordination of the 
economic policies of the Member States, but rather constitutes a 
financing mechanism'.76 Comparison with the ESM thus depends on 
whether contractual agreements are considered as an economic policy 
coordination tool or as a permanent stability mechanism. Connecting 
country-specific policy recommendations to incentivizing payments 
contains elements of both economic policy conduct and financial 
support. But while under the ESM financial support seeks 'to safeguard 
the financial stability of the euro area',77 under contractual agreements 
financial support aims at the implementation of structural reforms in 
order to promote the economic adjustment capacity of a Member State. 
In sum, in light of the different design and intention of the ESM and 
contractual agreements discussed here and given that Article 136 
TFEU has been the basis for more intrusive policy tools such as the 
national reform programmes under the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure, which does not require the consent of the country 
concerned, voluntary contractual agreements and financial support 
should remain within the ambit of economic policy coordination under 
Article 136 TFEU.  
 
Second, an alternative legal basis that is particularly relevant for the 
establishment for the fund attached to the contractual agreements lies 
in Article 175 (3) TFEU. Under this norm, specific measures serving the 
goals of Article 174 TFEU (promotion of overall harmonious 
development and strengthening of its economic, social and territorial 
cohesion) can be adopted, including the use of the EU funds specified 
in Article 175 (1) TFEU. Article 175 (3) provides the basis to adopt 
further measures, and the phrase 'specific actions […] outside the 
Funds' indicates that this provision could be used to establish new 
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financial support instruments.78 Accordingly, the European Union 
Solidarity Fund (EUSF) was set up in response to major natural 
disasters and expressed European solidarity to disaster-stricken 
regions within Europe.79 Also, the European Globalization Adjustment 
Fund, which provides support to people who have lost their jobs as a 
result of major structural changes in world trade patterns due to 
globalization, had been based on this provision.80 The degree of 
flexibility under this norm is further highlighted by the establishment of 
the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), the objective 
of which is to facilitate and promote cross-border, transnational and 
interregional cooperation between its members. The EGTC enjoys the 
legal capacity accorded to legal entities by national law and may be 
used to implement programmes co-financed by the Community or any 
other cross-border cooperation project with or without Community 
funding.81 Hence, in light of the instruments previously used under 
Article 175 (3), there are opportunities to design and endow the fund 
supporting contractual agreements on this basis, provided contractual 
agreements aim at strengthening the EU’s economic, social and 
territorial cohesion. 
  
Third, and depending on the specific design of the contractual 
agreements, Article 352 TFEU could provide the legal basis for a fund 
outside of the regular EU budget and of an agency entrusted with the 
implementation.82 According to the flexibility clause, the EU can take 
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appropriate measures if action by the Union should prove necessary, 
within the framework of the policies defined in the treaties, to attain one 
of the objectives set out in the treaties. In Pringle, the Court left 
unanswered the question whether a stability mechanism such as the 
ESM could be based on Article 352 TFEU.83 In principle, establishing a 
fund that promotes structural reforms under Article 352 TFEU appears 
to be feasible if the fund is necessary to attain the objectives mentioned 
in Article 3 TEU, notably to attain a 'sustainable development of Europe 
based on balanced economic growth' and to safeguard the 'economic 
and monetary union whose currency is the Euro'. However, actions 
under the flexibility clause must observe limitations imposed by the EU 
treaties, that is, they must not alter the institutional setting established 
by primary law. For example, Article 153 (4) TFEU must be observed – 
this rule allows the EU to support the Member States’ social and labour 
policies, excluding any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States. Given that any contractual agreement is intended to be 
in line with the country-specific policy recommendations given under 
the European Semester and the MIP, the policy instruments integrated 
into contractual agreements are likely to be compatible with other treaty 
provisions. However, given the unanimity requirement under Article 352 
TFEU, and as the Court has made clear in the Single European 
Patent84 case (namely that it is possible to make use of legal bases 
requiring unanimity through enhanced cooperation), resorting to 
enhanced cooperation might be the more realistic option, provided the 
above legal bases should not suffice given the specific design of 
contractual agreements.85  
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2. Inter se Agreements Between Member States 
A. General Design 
As an alternative to the contractual relationship between the EU and its 
Member States, one may also consider bi- or plurilateral agreements 
between Member States without the involvement of the EU. The 
interdependence of Member States participating in a single currency 
means that each state has a vital stake in all the others following sound 
economic policies. The crisis has shown that a lack of necessary 
reforms in one Member State can have negative effects in others. 
Conversely, the adoption of structural reforms in one country has a 
positive spillover effect on others – hence, there is a mutual interest in 
implementing structural reforms.86 Contractual agreements between 
Member States respond to this rationale. They are bilateral agreements 
between Member States in which the latter, voluntarily and at their own 
motion, commit to a certain reform or set of binding reforms. Reciprocity 
in the deal would ensure the positive cross-border spillovers from the 
domestic deal and increase the Member States’ otherwise lacking 
willingness to reform.  
 
The practical relevance of such agreements is illustrated by the 
ambitions expressed in the joint report from France and Germany on 
economic reforms focusing on competitiveness and investment 
issues.87 Even though such bilateral reform agendas have not been 
considered binding, they reflect both design and nature of the CCIs on 
a bilateral basis and it remains possible that bilateral agreements on 
structural reforms may politically more likely to be concluded given the 
reciprocal character of reforms.  
 
In the past, treaties between Member States related to EU matters 
were seen as possible threat to the EU legal order, especially when 
they applied to some (not all) Member States ('partial agreements') and 
were formed without involving the EU institutions.88 However, Member 
                                                 
86 Grüner (n 58) 30. 
87 Duffy (n 9) and Enderlein and Pisan-Ferry (n 10). To date, this initiative has 
been a rather political project without leading to a contractual or otherwise legally 
relevant coordination. 
88 S Peers, 'Towards a New Form of EU Law?: The Use of EU Institutions outside 
the EU Legal Framework' (2013) 9 EuConst 37, 40. 
States resorting to international agreements outside the EU legal order 
is, in itself, nothing new.89 Past inter se agreements include 
arrangements such as the Schengen framework90 or the Prüm 
Convention, in the area of justice and home affairs. In these cases, 
deeper integration was pursued by some, but not all, Member States by 
using an instrument of international law.91 More recently, inter se 
agreements between Member States reflected a general trend of 
intergovernmentalism being prevalent as strategy throughout the Euro 
crisis.92 A significant part of crisis-related measures – particularly 
related to budgetary surveillance system, financial stability measures 
and bailout mechanisms for countries in fiscal distress – has been 
addressed through measures outside the EU legal framework.93 This is 
done through international agreements, as experienced with the 
treaties establishing the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), both of which are 
supplementary to EU law measures governing the EMU.94 This 
approach is in line with an intergovernmental type of governance 
focussing on the leeway enjoyed by national governments to rely on the 
flexibility to act outside EU law.95 While crisis management outside the 
EU mechanisms proved effective to offer high flexibility in designing 
tailor-made policy tools, the limits of intergovernmentalism from the 
perspective of legitimacy and consistency have been voiced 
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repeatedly.96 It remains to be seen what role intergovernmentalism will 
play in post-crisis times over the coming years. 
 
B. Legal Scope 
EU law imposes restrictions on agreements between Member States.97 
In principle, international treaties involving Member States may be in 
conflict with the Union’s competences. Member States concluding an 
international treaty in areas for which the adoption of EU secondary law 
is possible encroach upon the allocation of competences under the EU 
Treaties. Particularly, as far as the respective competence refers to the 
ordinary legislative procedure, the co-decision rights of the European 
Parliament would be infringed.98 The allocation of competences in 
relation to exclusive and shared competences determines the scope of 
restrictions on Member States to conclude international agreements. It 
is well established that, in areas of exclusive EU competence (Articles 
2(1), 3(1) TFEU), Member States no longer have the right to enter into 
obligations with third countries.99 While the Court has explicitly made 
this restriction in relation to third countries only, it must also apply for 
the relation between Member States.100 By contrast, in the area of 
shared competence (Articles 2 (2), 4(2) TFEU), Member States are 
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excluded only once the EU exercises its competence.101 That is, if the 
EU exercises its internal competence, inter se treaties between 
Member States are no longer admissible.102 
 
Similar considerations apply in areas where the EU performs 
coordinating functions, as the Court spelled out in its Pringle judgment 
on the compatibility of the ESM Treaty with EU law. The Court noted 
that in areas where the European Treaties do not confer a 'specific 
competence' on the EU, Member States are generally free to act.103 In 
the areas concerned here – economic, labour, social policy (Article 2 
(3), 5 TFEU) – the Treaty does not confer specific competences, as the 
EU is allowed to act only by coordination. More specifically, Member 
States enjoy full competence in the domain of economic and fiscal 
policy and are thus free to enter into inter se treaties. Regarding the 
prospective content of mutual agreements, general restrictions exist in 
relation to the EU’s exclusive competence to conduct currency and 
monetary policy (Article 3 (1) c) TFEU). However, if inter se agreements 
coordinating economic policy have an effect on the stability of the euro 
or the inflation, this would not justify the EU’s exclusive competence, as 
'such an influence would constitute only the indirect consequence of the 
economic policy measures adopted'.104 
 
However, even though Member States continue to enjoy the freedom to 
conclude inter se treaties, they remain bound by the principle of sincere 
cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU, according to which the Union and 
the Member States shall assist each other in carrying out the tasks that 
arise from the treaties. Above all, this principle requires Member States 
to show restraint in cases of shared competences, so as not to 
predetermine potential future EU activities.105 This also applies to 
international agreements among Member States.106 In particular, this 
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principle may also restrict Member States’ freedom regarding the 
content of mutual agreements that aim to implement structural reforms, 
given that the EU has gained competence in specific fields of economic 
policy, particularly where fiscal policy conduct is concerned. The EU 
budgetary and macroeconomic surveillance system has been 
established on the grounds of Article 121 and 136 TFEU. As discussed 
above, structural reforms covering economic, social and labour policy 
have been incorporated into the European Semester, the SGP and the 
MIP and are developed and decided on by the Commission and the 
Council. The principle of sincere cooperation requires that mutual 
agreements between Member States would be in conformity with the 
country-specific recommendations and adjustment programmes 
adopted under the EU coordination mechanisms. In conclusion, EU 
Member States are generally free to conclude inter se treaties if these 
concern competences that genuinely remain in the domain of the 
Member States. However, content and design of the agreements must 
take into account the existing legal framework on EU coordination, thus 
safeguarding the functions of EU institutions.107 
 
Member States may also design mutual agreements by way of 
involving the EU, potentially as a broker and monitoring body for the 
agreement. The EU Commission would then facilitate and monitor 
bilateral agreements, and the CJEU may be called upon for judicial 
review. Guidance on the feasibility of such integration of EU institutions 
into inter se treaties can be sought from the Court’s Pringle judgment. 
In that case, the CJEU approved the involvement of EU institutions 
under the intergovernmental ESM Treaty to be in line with the principle 
of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU).108 The Court found no 
infringement of Article 13 TEU by assigning specific tasks to some EU 
institutions in areas which do not fall under the exclusive competence of 
the Union, 'provided that those tasks do not alter the essential 
character of the powers conferred on those institutions by the EU and 
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TFEU Treaties.'109 While this finding has been criticized as hampering 
the institutional design of the EU,110 allocating tasks to EU institutions in 
framing inter se agreements remains in line with established CJEU 
jurisprudence. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We currently observe a political-economy climate that gives little 
indication for deepening integration towards a 'fiscal federalism model' 
– Member States will continue to retain competence to conduct 
economic policy.111 It is thus likely that under-provision of structural 
reforms will remain a perennial phenomenon in the EU. The crisis 
revealed the adverse implications of sluggish structural reforms which 
led to comprehensive reform obligations for countries under financial 
assistance programmes.  
 
Beyond that, there is scope to employ existing and new legal 
instruments for the purpose of advancing structural reforms across the 
euro zone. By exploiting the existing surveillance tools and by 
introducing new arrangements under the current rules, surveillance and 
policy options are diversified, which enables more targeted responses 
to country-specific needs.112 There is significant leeway to account for 
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the implementation of structural reforms both in the preventive and the 
corrective arm of the SGP. Incorporating structural reform agendas 
developed under the European Semester and/or the MIP into the 
proceedings of the SGP would continue the overall trend of applying 
EU economic surveillance more broadly in a macroeconomic sense 
rather than being limited to fiscal parameters only. Thus, the current 
regime offers some flexibility in incorporating structural reforms, even 
though remaining within the traditional sanction-based logic of 
implementing policy reforms. Given the mixed compliance record, 
alternatives to sanctions should be considered. 
 
In this view, contractual agreements between the EU and Member 
States or among Member States would add a new legal instrument to 
the arsenal fostering structural reforms in the euro zone. Unlike existing 
instruments, contractual agreements allow for more egalitarian and 
reward-based incentives and thus deviate from the classical 
'surveillance model' of economic governance in the EU.113 Rewards 
would be set either through financial incentives or by reciprocity in the 
deal if other Member States also commit to structural reforms that 
generate positive spillover effects. 
 
What are the implications for the further trajectory of economic policy 
coordination efforts within the EU? Making use of the described 
flexibility options is likely to be the short-term avenue pursued by the 
EU institutions. In this vein, the Five Presidents’ Report has stressed 
the use of existing instruments in implementing structural reforms.114 
This may imply a stronger role of the European Semester as the forum 
to assess comprehensively, on a country-specific basis, the need for 
structural reforms, which could then be implemented under the MIP and 
SGP or through arrangements as discussed in this analysis. 
 
By contrast, the outlook for the implementation of contractual 
agreements seems far less clear. We should remember that it was the 
Commission that tabled the proposals of the Convergence and 
Competitiveness Instrument, which were then referred to by Germany 
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as potential 'Vertragspartnerschaften'. This explains the different 
reactions to the proposals. The European Parliament was rather 
sceptical towards the proposal, probably for fears about its role in 
contractual agreements115, while the Council reacted more positively.116 
The involvement of the European Parliament in contractual agreements 
does not seem to be a likely scenario considering the experience with 
MoU-based conditionality programmes during the crisis. The role of EU 
institutions would even be marginal if Member States were to conclude 
inter se agreements among each other making it most likely that EU 
institutions will put forward the incompatibility of such agreements with 
the EU legal order. By contrast, the role of the national parliaments 
involved could be strengthened through inter se agreements creating 
stronger ownership and legitimacy of these agreements. As the MoU 
experience during the crisis has shown, legality review is a preeminent 
issue. If contractual agreements were based on EU law (i.e. if agreed 
as MoUs based on secondary legislation), they could be challenged on 
grounds of EU law, while if the agreements were not EU law only 
national courts could assess legality on the basis of national law.117 
 
Despite the blurry outlook on implementation given heterogeneity of 
interests, one should consider contractual agreements as an additional 
policy instrument from a normative perspective. It abandons the current 
purely sanction-based approach of policy coordination and provides 
new strategic offers to Member States by incorporating rewards either 
on financial (EU contractual agreements) or reciprocal (inter se 
agreements) basis. Also, consistency of policy tools is not likely to 
suffer given the frequency and visibility of recommendations issued 
under the EU semester.  
 
What about political feasibility of contractual agreements? The latest 
Five Presidents’ Report does not explicitly refer to contractual 
agreements as a policy tool highlighting that this approach has recently 
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lost support, which according to commentators is due to some Member 
States’ resistance against this proposal. The vanishing support among 
Member States may also reflect the concern mainly of the net transfer 
beneficiaries of current EU financial support schemes that 
conditionality-based transfers would become the rule increasing the 
EU’s scope of intervention with national policies. However, both 
Member States and EU should not set aside the option of contractual 
agreement without further ado. Member States would benefit from 
incentivizing mechanisms that are – from a political-economy 
perspective – more effective, as financial support is more persuasive to 
constituents than just being spared from sanctions. And the EU would 
enlarge its policy space by diversifying the tools available to improve 
compliance with EU economic rules. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
